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Abstract
Second Lieutenant Charles Scheffel, B Company Platoon Leader, 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th
Infantry Division modified existing methods of venereal disease control in Algeria, North Africa
during Operation Torch after being ordered to reduce the venereal disease rate by his regimental
commander, Colonel William Ritter. Tasked with defeating the Germans first, Scheffel learned
other enemies lurked as well, and he instituted an illegal policy to solve the problem as fast and
as effectively as possible. Official United States policy on the eve of World War Two prohibited
the establishment and operation of a brothel. Scheffel operated this brothel as the United States
Army occupied Arab lands for the first time in its history and improved the combat effectiveness
of his regiment.
Keywords: Company B, 39th Infantry Regiment, William Ritter, Operation Torch, Venereal
Disease, Initiative, policy, prostitution, Sidi-bel-Abbès, penicillin, brothel, Algeria.
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Introduction
This thesis will examine the system of prostitution in Sidi-bel-Abbès, Algeria that existed
before the introduction of American troops in early 1943, and how the introduction of American
forces from the 39th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division transformed it. By introducing
penicillin, the control of venereal disease became possible for American forces. While it can
never be completely eradicated, penicillin was the cure that alleviated historically high rates of
venereal disease in the US Army dating back to World War I and even further. Venereal disease
has always been a problem for the US Military. With the advent of “bigger wars” the amount of
soldiers involved increased exponentially. The venereal disease problem, as it presented itself
during World War I, alerted the medical community in the inter-war years to the severity of the
problem as it related to the general population, and especially the military.
During World War I one hundred thousand more men were tallied as casualties due to
venereal disease than to being wounded or killed. Six and a half million days of duty were lost
during the roughly one and a half years the United States had troops abroad.1 Venereal disease
ranked fourth on the disease list, preceded by tuberculosis, heart disease, and mental deficiency.
The United States military also had specific trouble spots that accounted for high incidences,
such as in the Philippines, and in terms of specific groups, black troops had nearly a forty percent
rate of venereal disease.2 Out of the men who served in Europe during World War I the incident
rate was thirty four men per one thousand. Out of the men who served on the home front, one
hundred and twenty seven men per one thousand contracted venereal disease.3 This was a result
of poor education.

1

Henry Michie, Preventive Medicine During WWI Venereal Disease: Statistical Considerations, Chapter VII
(Washington DC: Office of the Surgeon General: Department of the Army, 1960), 263.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., 269.
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Syphilis and gonorrhea especially presented a public health challenge within the military
during World War I. Sexual abstinence was the policy that was officially set into law by the
Selective Service act of 1917, which forbid prostitution within five miles of a military base.
Soldiers were expected to not engage in sexual behavior outside of marriage. Punishment as
required by the Selective Service act of 1917 ranged from a fine to a year in jail for, “any person,
corporation, partnership, or association receiving or permitting to be received for immoral
purposes.”4 Through the inter war period the treatments of these diseases did not change. The
attitude of abstinence was reinforced through aggressive public health campaigns stemming from
the venereal disease problem recognized during World War I.
The United States, after entering World War II, decided that stopping Germany would be
its first priority. As a result of discussion with its allies the American Army set its eyes on North
Africa as the first place to combat the Axis. The logistical nightmare of shipping enough men,
material, and supplies was daunting and US officials gave little thought to civil affairs,
particularly the control of communicable disease. But the American Army would soon find out
that venereal disease control was crucial as soldiers arrived in a world of registered prostitution
that existed well before their presence.
The spread of venereal disease was always a problem at home, but it posed additional
problems for the United States Army in North Africa during World War II. Upon discovering the
size and scope of the problem, the American military adjusted established policies with a view to
improve upon local procedure to control venereal disease. This thesis will examine the 39th
Infantry Regiment and its struggle after assignment to Magenta, Algieria to maintain acceptable
venereal disease rates in North Africa. Magenta’s proximity to the town of Sidi-bel-Abbès put

4

65th Congress, Selective Service Act of 1917, (Session 1, Section 13, 1917).
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U.S soldiers in proximity of a town that not many of the soldiers had envisioned ever seeing in
their life. The home of the French Foreign Legion in Algieria, Sidi-bel-Abbès was a teeming
multi-cultural center with many different social layers. In 1943 Sidi-bel-Abbès would be a
hotbed for American soldiers looking to have a good time.

Venereal Disease and World War 1

The number one concern for any commander of troops, especially combat troops, is their
ability to perform their mission. The United States of America’s armed forces on the eve of
World War II again faced a problem they had encountered in World War I. Venereal disease
accounted for non combat casualties during World War I that reduced combat effectiveness and
stretched medical services. The official United States Army policy on sex during World War I
was abstinence.5 Social and religious factors shaped American views on the subject, and it was
expected that troops would adhere to a home front moral standard overseas. Contraction and
actual treatment of the disease was a terrifying experience that would do little to influence any
type of moral standard imposed on young men thousands of miles from home, free from family
and community pressure.
When American entry into World War I was imminent, the Selective Service Act of 1917
allowed the Federal Government to raise the necessary army through conscription. An average of
five percent of inductees had venereal disease, with seven states reporting rates of ten percent or
higher.6 The Selective Service Act of 1917 also prohibited prostitution within five miles of all
military bases and expanded legal authority to the military to enforce the prohibition. The Public

Michael Imber, “The First World War, Sex Education, and The American Social Hygiene Association’s Campaign
Against Venereal Disease,” Journal of Educational Administration and History ,(1984), 16, 47-56.
6
Ibid.
5
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Health Service claimed that by the war’s end ninety percent of prostitution had been eliminated
in areas surrounding bases.7 Many reopened as soon as hostilities ceased. Out of the Selective
Service Act was born an educational initiative designed to inform the troops on the ills and
horrors of venereal disease. Military planners were aware of a number of factors that influenced
sexual promiscuity and they included, but were not limited to alcohol use and proximity to
prostitution.8
In 1917 the Commission on Training Camp Activities formed to address the recreational
needs of recruits. Its establishment sought to curb “the sexual impulse…through instruction,
exercises, and wholesome entertainment.” Many felt that the war and its aftermath would simply
exacerbate the spread of venereal disease.”9 As the draft began to take effect, and more soldiers
entered the ranks of the military, it was apparent to the medical officers screening these soldiers
upon induction that, “high levels of venereal disease were found among recruits and that medical
men working among the troops found that there was a gross ignorance and mis-education on the
whole subject of sex.” 10 Without the knowledge of how to diagnosis, prevent, and treat syphilis
or gonorrhea, a soldier was more likely to contract and spread those diseases.
Out of the roughly three and a half million hospital admissions during World War I,
eleven percent, or roughly 380,000 cases were as a result of venereal disease.11 As American
troops flooded into France, President Georges Clemenceau wrote to John Pershing offering
France’s help in establishing special bordellos for American troops. Bordellos in the French
7
8

Ibid.
Michie, Venereal Disease, Statistical Considerations, 271.

9

Alexandra M. Lord, Condom Nation The U.S. Governments Sex Education Campaign From World War 1 to the
Internet, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 2010), 24.
10

Ibid.
Frederick Holmes,Venereal Disease: Index of Essays-WWI. (University of Kansas School of Medicine 2014),
Volume 1, 1.
11
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military during World War 1 operated out in the open. Pershing passed the letter up to Secretary
of War Newton Baker who said “My God, if Wilson sees this he’ll stop the war.”12
By not giving soldiers condoms in World War I the US Army reflected the social
attitudes towards sex and prostitution. Venereal disease was looked at as a moral problem rather
than a public health problem. Propaganda posters targeted soldiers from World War I. They
denigrated French prostitutes and painted them in an even more unflattering light as infected
enemies. This was in comparison to the established prostitution rings for French officers who
had their choice of upscale prostitute.13 In the American army, Major Hugh Young, a rising star
in the field of urology at the time, oversaw a new military consensus that made commanding
officers in the field directly responsible for the sexual health of their troops.14 Officers were
required to take appropriate action, by any means necessary, to ensure the sexual health of their
troops. Soldiers taken off the line during World War I were disciplined by their officers.
Discipline usually involved cutting a soldier’s pay.
Some soldiers responded to such regulations in novel ways, including contracting
venereal disease through non sexual means. Analogous to shooting one’s self in the foot to avoid
combat, soldiers in trenches were known to spread venereal disease using a wide range of
methods, including the notorious matchstick method. A soldier who had discharge as a symptom
would swab out the inside of his urethra with a matchstick. For a fee, this matchstick would then
be inserted into a healthy man’s urethra, giving him the disease and a chance to get off the line.
This demonstrates some of the means employed by soldiers to get out of combat, and who would
then be judged and disciplined for contracting such a disease.15 The stigma for contraction was

12

Ibid.
Michie, Venereal Disease, Statistical Considerations, 271.
14
Ibid., 2.
15
Ibid., 1.
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high amongst the enlisted men, and especially black troops who did not have access to basic
education. Officers were usually free from the stigma. The treatment for syphilis in World War I
was to have several mercury injections into a man’s urethra, a painful procedure. This pain, and
the way it was inflicted through needle injections in a sensitive body part made some soldiers
think twice.16
Treatment options in the military were usually met with skepticism by the troops that
required it. Atabrine, used as a cure for malaria, had a wide range of side effects including
yellowing of the skin, nausea, and psychosis.17 Soldiers’ deep suspicion of Atabrine led medical
officers to verify that soldiers did in fact swallow their Atabrine tablets when given to them.
Atabrine had a high success rate when taken correctly, and like other treatments for syphilis and
gonorrhea it acted as a deterrent because of the perceived side effects. Meanwhile the treatment
for syphilis and gonorrhea had very real side effects in the form of pain.
Other efforts arose following the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1917. The issue
of venereal disease required coordination with other civilian agencies. The US Public Health
Service and the American Social Hygiene Association attempted to raise awareness on the issue
of venereal disease. Their main goal was to further educational outreach in areas around military
bases that could be a hotbed for prostitution, and other illicit activities that soldiers might seek in
their free time. Educational campaigns and programs to teach public health around military bases
arose.
By the end of World War I the effort to contain venereal disease was perceived to be a
failure. Fifteen percent of American soldiers visited the hospital for gonorrhea and syphilis.18

16

J.E.R McDonough, The Treatment of Syphillis in 1915, (London Lock Hospitals), 1915. N.P. #.
Paul Russell, Preventative Medicine in WWII Communicable Diseases, Malaria, Volume VI, (Office of the
Surgeon General: Department of the Army: Washington D.C, 1963), 7.
18
Imber, The First World War Campaign Against Venereal Disease, 47-56.
17
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The rate of venereal disease stationed in the United States was 50% higher than those serving
overseas. Incidence among troops in the Philippines in that same time period was higher than
50%. According to these statistics, American women should have been watched more closely
than foreign women given the disease rate on the home front.19 Arguably a head start could have
been gained on the issue had the American military taken the simple step of providing condoms
to their soldiers and prophylactic stations.

Venereal Disease Policy on the Eve of American Involvement in World War II

The draft of 1917, which conscripted one million young men, served as a litmus test for
health agencies. The military was aware as well that many young men would be entering the
service with venereal disease.20The conscripted soldiers coming into the ranks of the military to
meet the manpower needs of World War I got the attention of the medical community. The U.S.
Public Health Service (USPHS) was one of the primary agenices in raising awareness among the
civilian population and the military about venereal disease. From 1918-1920 the USPHS
launched an ambitious campaign to bring sex education to America. The USPHS targeted rural
communities in America because of their distance from cities and their inability to ascertain
useful information quickly. Informational pamphlets, lectures, motion pictures, and exhibits were
produced.
Dr. Thomas Parran was the sixth US Surgeon General, serving from 1936 to 1948. In
1937 he published a book entitled Shadow on the Land: Syphilis. With war looming and the mass
mobilization of men and material more and more likely, health officials anticipated an increase
19

Holmes, Venereal Disease, 2.
Thomas Parran, M.D. Surgeon General of the United States, Shadow on the Land: Syphillis. (United States Public
Health Service, New York 1937), 122.
20
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in communicable disease, particularly venereal disease. Relaxed moral attitudes in the 1920’s
had led to a sexual revolution of sorts. Dr. Parran’s book led to a more general awareness and,
eventually, legislative action. Dr. Parran’s book, many argue, led to the freeing of federal funds
that created the La Follette Bulwinkle Act of 1938.21
The federal funding procured through the La Follette-Bulwinkle Act of 1938 allowed for
the organization of venereal disease educational programs on the state level. The Bulwinkle Act
created an atmosphere of cooperation between the federal government and civilian state agencies
such as the US Public Health Service. After World War I these organizations cooperated to bring
sex education to many rural areas in the country. The co-operation that the USPHS and the
American Social Hygiene Association demonstrated post-World War I was sought once again.
Collaborative effort sought during a number of conferences produced an agreement officially
called, “An Agreement by the War and Navy Departments, the Federal Security Agency, and
State Health Departments Measure for the control of the Venereal Diseases in Areas where
Armed Forces or National Defense employees are contracted.” Known as the Eight Point
Agreement, it was adopted by the Conference of State and Territorial Health Officers, and its
recommendations and policy were adopted by the US Armed Forces in September of 1940.22 The
Eight Point Agreement was soon joined by the May Act. The May Act gave broad authority to
the military to police areas outside of military establishments with regards to prostitution. The
May Act also allowed the military to close down any establishment that was linked to
prostitution. The US Surgeon General and the Army approved the May Act on July 11, 1941 as a
means of policing prostitution and venereal disease.

21

Sternberg et, al, Preventive Medicine During WWII: Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact or
Unknown Means. Volume V Chapter X (Department of the Army.Washington DC 1960), 140.
22
Ibid.
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This high level of control around military bases was seen as essential to combat the
spread of venereal disease. Coupled with the educational attempt by the US Public Health
Service and the American Social Hygiene Association, officials put in place a dragnet around
bases to prevent prostitution and venereal disease. Many commanding officers around bases did
not take this seriously and preferred to “wink at prostitution” and ignore the official Army policy
directing a “vigorous” repression of prostitution.23
The War Department concluded in its War Department Circular No. 249 that “the guiding
principle shall continue to be that continence and self control not only develop character, but are
the only completely satisfactory methods of preventing venereal disease.”24 Former boxing
champion Gene Tunney, who was an officer in the US Navy, conducted a speaking crusade
about the perils of venereal disease. Readers Digest printed Tunney’s essential message:

Tally cards seized as evidence showed how much these prostitutes had earned in one day;
three cards showed forty-nine, thirty-seven, and twenty-eight customers…Can you
imagine what happened to the hundred and fourteen servicemen who visited them that
day? Can our sailors and soldiers, as champions of democracy, afford to indulge in sexual
promiscuities, scorned by most prize fighters? Dare they forget that in the First World
War, seven million days of service were lost to the US Army as a result of venereal
infections?
Tunney would later admit that the appeal to continence was a failure because, “men don’t get
medals for practicing it.” 25

23

John Costello, Love Sex & War: Changing Values 1939-1945 (University of Virginia: HarperCollins 1985), 128.
Ibid., 129.
25
Ibid.
24
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Right before the Pearl Harbor attack, General George C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of
Staff, issued a directive aimed at repressing prostitution. He argued that if venereal disease
existed in a unit, unit commanders had failed to prevent soldiers from visiting houses of
prostitution. Marshall went on to say: “The guiding principle shall continue to be that continence,
and self-control not only develop character but are the only completely satisfactory methods of
preventing venereal disease.”26 Unit commanders would be held responsible for keeping their
soldiers uninfected.

Venereal Disease in Sidi-bel-Abbès, Algeria
In July of 1942 Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill decided that the first
Anglo-American Allied offensive target would be North Africa. They agreed to appoint Dwight
Eisenhower the Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force that would invade North
Africa. American military strategy up to this point would have told these leaders that a direct
thrust into France would be the most advantageous. Eisenhower scribbled on a note to himself on
January 22, 1942 that “We’ve got to go to Europe and fight, and we’ve got to stop wasting
resources all over the world and still worse time.” 27 Churchill, however, pushed vigorously for
an invasion of North Africa, claiming that the Americans were not ready for an attack directly
into Hitler’s war machine. Churchill lobbied for an invasion of North Africa which the American
military command rejected almost immediately. Roosevelt considered his options carefully. With
the vast amount of German men and material tied up by the Russians, and with the United States’
recent support of Russia through the Lend-Lease Act, Roosevelt felt that he had to open up a
second front against the Germans in order to support the Russians. American military advisors
26

Ibid.

27

Rick Atkinson. Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-43. (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 2002), 11.

10

told Roosevelt that if the Russian effort against Germany collapsed then the war could last a
decade. 28
The capture of 30,000 British troops at Tobruk marked a change in Roosevelt’s thinking.
He could no longer consider an invasion of France which was nicknamed SLEDGEHAMMER.
On July 30th, 1942 Roosevelt closed the door on an amphibious invasion of France. He chose
North Africa as the spot to open up a front against Germany under the codename TORCH. Thus
began a massive undertaking to launch what would be at that time the world’s largest
amphibious invasion. The main goal of Operation Torch was to control North Africa from
Morocco through Algeria, which would place an Allied Army in Tunisia behind the Axis armies
in Libya. For the first time in history, the United States Army would find itself operating within
an Arab population.
Ensuring tactical military success depended on many things in North Africa. The biggest
question on a tactical level was whether or not the Vichy French soldiers in North Africa would
fight against the Americans. American planners hoped that in the face of the overwhelming odds,
the French would abandon their de facto alliance with Germany. George Marshall, in a memo to
President Roosevelt in September of 1942, informed him of the plan to co-opt the Vichy
administration in North Africa:

The success of the TORCH operation is critically dependent upon the
reactions of the authorities, inhabitants and troops of North Africa. With
this in mind, General Eisenhower has on his staff a Civil Administrative
Section to co-ordinate the civil and political matters in immediate relation
to the operation. He urgently requests that men from the State Department
28

Ibid., 15.
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be released to serve on this body.29

The 9th Infantry Division took part in the Allied landings for Operation Torch after
having spent the better part of October and early November on troop transport ships headed for
North Africa. The divisional baptism by fire took place on November 8th, when a battalion of the
39th Infantry Regiment appeared at the gates of the Maison Blanche airfield.30 Several French
troops attempted to save face by firing wild shots into the advancing the Americans, but gave up
immediately upon realizing who they were facing. American troops ran into firing French
soldiers for up to three days after the invasion.31 Most of these incidents were not serious and
lasted for very short periods of time. After the initial invasion, the 9th Infantry Division would
enter a period of quiet for roughly two and a half months. The Battle of Kasserine Pass brought
little action to the 9th Infantry Division, however, the divisional artillery played a key role during
the battle.32
The 39th Infantry’s toughest task came on March 28th, 1943. From the American
perspective the 39th commanded the right flank of the battle near a cluster of hills called the
Djebel Berda area. Their main goal was the assault of Hill 369, thought to be lightly guarded.33
General Manton S. Eddy, the divisional commander, ordered the 47th Infantry regiment34 to
attack Hill 369. Roughly half the regiment was lost and General Eddy received a verbal lashing
from General Patton. In an attempt to cover his tracks, Eddy ordered the 2nd battalion of the 39th

29

Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governor. (Center of Military History United
States Army. Washington D.C 1992), 31.
30
Maison Blanche Airfield is currently known as the Houari Boumediene Airport and is located less than five miles
from La Bateau Casse where soldiers from the 9th Infantry Division landed on November 8th, 1942.
31

Atkinson, Army at Dawn, 116.
Ibid., 455.
33
Ibid.
34
The 47th was a sister regiment of the 39th Infantry Regiment.
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Infantry to finish the job. Almost the entire battalion was lost. The 39th Infantry Regiment, as
well as the 47th would see heavy losses at the end of March 1943. The intensity of the fighting,
and the reduction of numbers are explained by Rick Atkinson:

Tens of thousands of mortar and artillery rounds fell on both sides. The 9th Division
would expend more than a million rounds of rifle and machine gun ammunition at El
Guettar. The 47th Infantry added another 75 stretcher bearers to the regiment’s original
sixteen; the 39th added sixty. Even the squeal of ambulance brakes at night drew fire. The
dead were stacked like sawed logs in a truckbed and hauled to Gafsa for burial.35

The 39th Infantry Regiment after March of 1943 would find itself on guard duty in
Algeria for the better part of three months. During this time soldiers found themselves in a
strange land, one far from home and teeming with exotic pleasures and places. The search for
alcohol, distraction, and sex became paramount to many soldiers reconciling their fates in their
heads and sitting in the desert with nothing but time on their hands. One of these areas the men
of the 9th Infantry Division found themselves in was a town called Sidi-bel-Abbès. The city of
Sidi-bel Abbès was no stranger to prostitution and venereal disease by the time the United States
Army showed up. A search on prostitution in the area yields records stretching back about one
hundred years. A multi-cultural center, Sidi-bel-Abbès was the home of the French Foreign
Legion in Algeria from 1843-1962.36 The Legion had maintained a brigade sized presence, but
after World War 1 the importance of Sidi-bel-Abbès as a military base lessened as French
colonial prospects lessened.
35

Atkinson, Army at Dawn, 458.
David Jordan, The History of the French Foreign Legion from 1831 to Present Day, (London: The Lyons Press,
2005), 38.
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13

In Sidi-bel-Abbes, the inadequacies of the United States’ public health plan became
readily apparent. The United States’ public health plan as compared to the battle plan for North
Africa was vague at best, and nonexistent at first.37 The scope of the disease problem was not
realized until American soldiers were on the ground. The French had long before set up
rudimentary systems of public health, but it was mostly confined to French soldiers and support
personnel, not the indigenous population. Existing systems of prostitution in Algeria utilized by
the French, and particularly the French Foreign Legion were adapted and expanded upon by
American forces. In colonial Algeria the French had made great strides in safeguarding the
health of its settlers and soldiers for over a century, but not the locals. The locals meanwhile
continued to live in filth and disease, as compared to other living conditions, particularly in the
United States.38
The number of prostitutes in North Africa prior to Allied involvement was
massive. Many population centers larger than a hamlet officially contained at least a couple of
prostitutes.39 Hundreds of prostitutes could be found in larger cities. Prostitutes in Algeria fell
into one of two categories: “inscrítes soumises or inscrítes insoumises.” Inscrítes soumises
represented prostitutes that were registered and operated in a recognized house of prostitution.
Inscrítes insoumises represented a registered prostitute who did not operate in a recognized
house, but rather operated as a freelancer. Registration as a prostitute was compulsory, unless the
woman had been arrested on morals charges.40 Moral charges were filed against a prostitute who
was operating out of her designated area. Once registered, a prostitute could not change her

37

Richard Taylor, Preventive Medicine in WWII Civil Affairs/Military Government Public Health Activites. Volume
VIII. (Office of the Surgeon General: Department of the Army: Washington DC 1976) 255.
38
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profession unless it was officially changed by French authorities. Twice a week registered
prostitutes in Algeria were supposed to report to their local health center for a cursory inspection
of their skin. They also underwent a speculum inspection of their vagina and cervix. Cervical
smears were also taken from the woman and stained with methylene blue and examined
immediately. A serologic test was also required every three months for syphilis.
Colonel Perrin H. Long was the American forces headquarters consultant on medical
issues in North Africa. Dr. Long immediately saw fault with how quickly the tests were
conducted in North Africa. He also noted how each health center was conducting these tests and
collecting material on up to one hundred women per day.41 Long’s own personal observation in
Algiers and Oran contradicted with what was presented to him as official policy. Long found that
only one in ten women actually received proper testing through the methylene smear method.42
The regulated form of inspection was found to be inadequate by American standards.
While the “inscrites soumises” and the “inscrites insoumises” were subjected to a substandard
form of medical inspection, there was an unknown class of prostitute that would add to the
prostitute population and provide further challenges to the public health of American soldiers
because they generally received no inspection and had no access to treatment. According to
French authorities, clandestine prostitution had existed in some of the larger cities, with
prostitutes operating in and around hotel and café areas. As a result of German occupation,
particularly after the fall of France, a large number of individuals were displaced or found
themselves in entirely new areas. Underpaid female workers in other professions found that, with
the influx of American soldiers and money, they could make a living by becoming a prostitute.
Beginning with the American invasion on November 8th, 1942 the rise of “clandestine” further

41
42

Ibid.
Ibid., 207.
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impeded French efforts to control disease. By burdening the existing testing system with new
workers, it added to the pool of women who would not receive proper testing. These “new”
prostitutes constituted a large section of women who were not subjected to the medical
requirements imposed on the incrites soumises. This, coupled with weak testing methods,
allowed venereal disease to run rampant after American occupation in November of 1942.
Confronted with the widespread use and availability of prostitution, the US Military had two
options. Officials concluded that banning prostitution outright was impossible because of the
availability of prostitutes in the area. The second option, the one American planner’s eventually
settled on, was to allow de facto access to prostitution as long as it was regulated and controlled.
43

Americans then found themselves regulating a system of prostitution without the medical

knowledge and material ability to solve the problem.
Public health in a war zone depends on cooperation between the occupier and the civilian
population that is under control by the occupier. This relationship existed as a result of
infrastructure and the ability of the population to support hospitals, education centers, and other
treatment facilities. While the colonial French had access to health centers where venereal
disease was checked, the local Muslim population did not, greatly improving the chances local
women did not have the knowledge necessary to prevent the spread of venereal disease. Once
the Allies landed, the Civil Affairs doctrine for Operation Torch was as follows:
The Allies had no political course in mind other than to win campaigns in
the field while allowing the French to work out their own internal problems
unhampered and unaided. This policy was avowed by the President and
set forth as approved military doctrine….The fundamental purpose was to
avoid any interference with the population, except what was necessary and
43
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inescapable to assist military operatons.44

From recommendations came hard policy decisions from President Roosevelt. He
appointed Robert Murphy as his personal representative for civil affairs and gave him
ambassadorial rank.45 Murphy was given the title of Operating Executive head of the Civil
Affairs Section for Operation Torch and Advisor for Civil Affairs under General Eisenhower.
Murphy had long had the ear of President Roosevelt. Roosevelt perhaps felt that by having
Murphy on the ground, he would be able to manage his next directive. In the same memo in
which he appointed Murphy, Roosevelt informed him that, “no change in the existing French
Civil Administration is contemplated by the United States.”46
From The Medical Department of the Army wrote later “It is important to note that
certain conclusions concerning American civil affairs policy, which were arrived at following the
TORCH operation, affected all later civil affairs planning.”47 The plan assumed that the French
Army and colonial police would control the Arab population. This issue would be decided
shortly after the Allied invasion on November 8th. Allied negotiations with the French
representatives loyal to Chief of Vichy State Marshal Pétain on November 10th, 1942 attempted
to convince Pétain that it was time to support the Allies and their mission to topple Nazi
Germany. American invasion forces were met with Vichy French forces that were ready to lay
down their arms in most cases. These negotiations centered on what the Allies could offer.
Supplies and goods, and a reminder of American power were presented to Vichy representatives.
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The Germans also wanted the support of the French. For the Germans, their civil affairs plan for
North Africa was markedly similar to the Americans It focused on gaining control and
maintaining the status quo of the local population so as not to affect military operations. The plan
was that French inhabitants would be regarded as friendly and as allies to be gained in the fight
against Germany, however this never happened. 48. According to American planners, the Arabs
were not willing to change their living conditions and improve their personal hygiene, and did
not receive any type of education on basic sanitary living, which would include education on
venereal disease. The substandard living conditions were seen as a threat by American forces
before they landed in North Africa.49
In January of 1943 British and American forces hosted a conference in Algiers with local
French representatives. American and British forces learned the extent of the prostitution
problem in Algeria and elsewhere. Algeria itself had over 600 registered prostitutes.50 As
General Marshall insisted U.S. Army local commanders bore the responsibilities of ensuring that
their troops did not fall prey to the lure of sex and alcohol, a deadly duo of dissolution, in foreign
lands. Arab Africa was certainly foreign, a brew of French and Arab culture unfathomable to the
average GI. The French Colonial Army and the people of Algeria had established a cultural
truce: liquor and sex could be found for the money in certified, isolated locations that were wellpoliced and inspected by medical personnel. In return, Arab women need not fear molestation by
European soldiers. Sexual relations between an Arab woman and foreign soldier would be
considered rape, punishable under French law and (worse) the cause of violent revenge by the
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“wronged” women’s family. A blood feud rarely improved relations between civilians and the
military.
Colonel William L. Ritter would take command of the 39th Infantry of the 9th Infantry
Division on April 26th 1943, after two regimental commanders were captured or killed in April
of 1943. William Oakes would be lost at El Guettar and Trimble Brown at Djebel el Garsia,
respectably in April 1943.51 Ritter was assigned to the 39th Infantry after Brigadier General
Donald Stroh, the Assistant Divisional commander, took control of the 39th Infantry. Stroh
commanded the 39th during a critical engagement centered around Hill 438 after Trimble Brown
had been captured. Ritter would find himself in command of a combat weakened regiment which
had sustained heavy losses during April 1943. 52
Ritter was born in Hartford City, Indiana on January 12, 1898. He had enlisted in the
Army in June of 1918 and fought at Belleau Wood alongside the U.S. Marines. Ritter was an
artillery spotter for support units in the battle. Having served in World War I, his familiarity with
the French certainly helped him in North Africa, although his personal attitudes towards the
French are unclear. His combat experience in World War 1, coupled with his command of the
39th Infantry Regiment in North Africa, put Ritter on the fast track. From 1944-1946 he was
deputy commander in chief of US Forces North Africa Middle Eastern forces under General B. L
Giles. Prior to his promotion, Ritter would implement and oversea a regulated bordello in his
unit, at a time when venereal disease was running rampant in a unit getting rest after a long fight.
Ritter would give this task to young lieutenant Charles Scheffel, B Company Rifle platoon leader
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from Oklahoma who knew very little about his own Army, let alone containing venereal disease
in a foreign land.
Born in 1919 in Oklahoma to parents of German descent, Scheffel had a middle class
upbringing in Dust Bowl America in the 1930’s. His father owned a tire shop in Oklahoma City
prior to Scheffels’ birth. Choosing a rural existence to escape the city, Scheffel’s father moved
one hundred miles north of Oklahoma City to Enid, Oklahoma. He opened a filling station,
became respected in the business community, and engaged in mineral rights speculation.53 A
second son, Stanley, was born when Scheffel was two years old, and after three years it was
apparent that Stanley had dwarfism. When Scheffel was 11 his father died, leaving behind his
wife and a special needs brother. The family faced the Depression as a single income family with
few assets. Scheffel’s mother sold off their Studebaker automobile, made the families’ clothes,
grew vegetables, and collected rainwater. Scheffel earned nearly a dollar a day on his aunt’s farm
when unemployment was at record levels. For seven summers after his father died, Scheffel
worked on his aunt’s farm as his mother thought it would be good for him.54 Scheffel continued
to grow and mature, while always allotting time to work on his basketball game he would
cultivate into a ticket to college.
In 1938 Oklahoma A&M offered Scheffel a full scholarship.55 Oklahoma A&M, as a
federal land grant college, required two years of Army ROTC for its students. Scheffel studied
finance and with basketball taking up a good deal of his time, took the minimum course
requirements for ROTC. Scheffel had a good sense that the war was coming. In the fall of 1940
Congress passed the Selective Service act of 1940 requiring males over the age of 18 to register
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for military service. If a student took the advanced ROTC course they had the option of
becoming an officer. The basketball coach at Oklahoma A&M Coach Hank Iba, informed his
eager athletes that it was better to take the advanced course so that one could sign up for the
military on their own terms, like choosing to be an officer.56
Scheffel went on to take the advanced course, a path that would lead him to being
commissioned in the Officer Reserve Corps as a second lieutenant. Scheffel went through the
paces of training. His commissioning was in June of 1942, shortly before shipping overseas for
the November 8th three pronged invasion of North Africa.
Lieutenant Scheffel’s deployment say him headed for Europe on the luxury liner the
Queen Elizabeth. Scheffel was deployed to Europe to train for the invasion. The 39th Infantry
Regiment, which Scheffel was a part of landed in Glasgow, Scotland. Scheffel and a company
sized force immediately got detached from the 39th Infantry Regiment to engage in what
amounted to be an experiment resulting from inexperience. Since the British had a significant
fighting force in Libya and Egypt already, American commanders thought it would be a good
idea to integrate some of the veteran British units with the fresh American ones. Scheffel was in
charge of the 21st Highlanders, a supply company of the 1st Highlander regiment.
In his personal account Second Lieutenant Scheffel alludes to his displeasure with being
assigned to a British unit although he was able to learn some things that kept him alive and
served him well throughout the war.57 For three months, Scheffel was a member of this supply
company attached to the 1st Highland Division, and it was not until February of 1942 that he
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rejoined the 39th Infantry Regiment of the Ninth Infantry Division in Algeria. Scheffel became a
B Company rifle platoon leader and was assigned by the regimental commander Colonel
William Oakes in March of 1943 to secure the town of Philippeville from saboteurs and
thieves.58 Philippevílle is a coastal town in Northern Algeria. French, British, and American
troops from the Ninth Infantry Division and First Infantry Division had their own camps around
the town. Social activities available for soldiers in Philippeville included, but were not limited to
prostitution, drinking, gambling, and “carousing.” This created the potential for a volatile
environment, and Scheffel knew it. He formed a patrol with British and French units after some
“local hoodlums” roughed up some drunken American servicemen.59 Scheffel’s job specifically
was to close the bistros and bordellos at dark and to make sure that there were no violations of
the blackout policy.
Examples from Orléansville, Algeria highlight the issues created not by thieves and
sabatoeurs, but by Americans themselves. In March of 1943, in Orleansville in Algeria, there
was an incident involving the shooting of an Arab local by an American soldier. American
soldiers, who suspected the local population of stealing food and supplies, took it upon
themselves to go find the culprits. A document received by Allied Force Headquarters outlined
the French complaint about drunken American soldiers who were bivouacking in various
neighborhoods in and around Orleansville. “During the night the soldiers leave their quarters and
go into town. Some get drunk and fire off shots which has stirred up the emotions of the
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population...It is absolutely necessary to obtain from the American authorities immediate
dispatch of the Military Police.”60 Charles Scheffel ran into AWOL soldiers as well.
On one of the nights Scheffel went to close down a brothel in Philippevíle, he was
greeted by a madam who allowed him to search the house. However, Scheffel walked in on a
First Infantry Division soldier engaging in sex with a prostitute. As Scheffel remembered, “This
guy had to be AWOL, the 1st was fighting in Tunisia, and even if he was in support unit, this guy
was miles away from the rear.” Scheffel chose to let the man go as long as he promised that he
would return to his unit.61 The 1st Infantry Division soldier AWOL miles away from his unit
engaging in sexual acts demonstrates the lack of control that that led to policy allowing bordellos
Scheffel’s first run-in with soldiers utilizing the services of local girls would not be his
last dealings with the sex trade. After Philippeville, Scheffel became upset with his current
posting with his British comrades, desiring a return to the 9th Infantry Division. He requested, to
little protest from the British, that he be detached from the 21st Highlanders and allowed to find
his unit. Scheffel located the 9th Infantry Division headquartered near Sidi-bel-Abbès in
Magenta, a small isolated oasis 30 miles from Sidi-bel-Abbès. As a result of Magenta’s
proximity to Sidi-bel-Abbès, Scheffel noticed his men started to go AWOL with increasing
frequency by hitchhiking or walking towards civilization. Scheffel says, “The men of the 9th
Division did not take well to living isolated in tents at the edge of the desert with nothing to do
but drill.”62 Sidi-bel-Abbès had a local population of 50,000 people, and with pleasures so close
the problem of AWOL became very real for Scheffel. A French Foreign Legion brigade, who
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previously occupied the prostitutes’ time, was fighting in Tunisia. When the 9th Infantry Division
set up camp, the women had not received their usual flow of customers for some time. Daily
inspections of the American men’s genitals, known affectionately in the Army as “short arm”
inspections confirmed what some feared. The proximity to Sidi-bel-Abbès had become a barrier
to keeping the 39th Infantry combat effective.63
A cosmopolitan center, Sidi-bel-Abbès had a rich history of prostitution in
conjunction with the French Foreign Legion presence. The central part, or European heart of the
city, had well maintained and designed streets. It led to an area known as the fabourg Bugeaud,
but more popularly known as the village nègre.64 Here the “streets smelled of kebabs and dung,
Arabs hustled donkeys laden with impossible loads between the low-roofed houses, and the
bleating of terrified sheep in the abattoir mingled with the raucous quarrel of prostitutes.65
Diversity abounded, at the height of an average day in the village nègre one could find native
Algerians as well as members of the substantial local Jewish population. Bel Abbèsians,
transplants from Europe could be found at local markets and on the streets.66 While precise
proportions are difficult to gauge the local prostitute population undoubtedly drew from, and
reflected, the racial diversity in both culture and skin color.
After knowledge of this problem spread, Scheffel was summoned by Colonel
William Ritter, regimental commander of the 39th Infantry. In his memoirs Scheffel describes
entering a tent to find Colonel Ritter, and a major who was the battalion surgeon. Scheffel was
asked if he could stand to look at a naked woman without going crazy. “Barely” was Scheffel’s
63

Ibid., 96. Scheffel notes in his personal memoir that one company had gone down to 160 men, from a normal
strength of 220-250. At the height of the problem they were losing 40 percent of their available force to venereal
disease and illness. Scheffel notes jokingly, “The doctors were treating more and more cases, some with symptoms
they had never seen before.”
64
Douglas Porch, The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force, (New York:
Sky Horse Publishing 2010), 411.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.

24

response. Scheffel was ordered to go to Oran, which was over 100 miles away from his location,
to procure a new miracle drug. The miracle drug that Colonel Ritter was referring to was
penicillin. Penicillin allowed for the existing system of regulation to exist unchanged, however,
with the introduction of penicillin a cure actually existed that could get rid of venereal disease.
Armed with this new miracle drug, Scheffel, much like the overall civil affairs plan, piggybacked
an already established system and made it work with penicillin. The idea was born then to run a
regimental bordello67. Scheffel was ordered to collect money from every company so that the
bordello could be operated in Sidi-bel-Abbès. Scheffel visited every company commander in the
39th Infantry Regiment. Most of which had a slush fund, a pool of donated funds from the
soldiers in the unit that would go to a particular activity or cause. Most only had a few hundred
dollars in them. Scheffel attained three thousand dollars from company commanders in the 39th
Infantry Regiment for the establishment of a regulated US Army bordello.68
Colonel Ritter, with the battalion surgeon present, was aware of what he was facing as
evidenced by the upper echelon medical efforts of Colonel Perrin H. Long M.D. Long was the
American forces headquarters consultant on medical issues.69 After researching the issue of
prostitution in North Africa the medical consensus was that American forces should do
everything in their power to keep the local prostitute population of roughly six hundred clean.
Unregistered prostitutes Long believed presented a disease transmission issue since their health
could not be monitored. This fact, Dr. Long concluded, was enough for him to recommend that
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they should, “convince Allied medical officers to support and maintain a system of controlled
prostitution.”70 Registered prostitutes insisted that the Army provide prophylactic stations and
that soldiers perform pre coitus and post coitus cleansing routines or face disciplinary action.
Morever, he believed, if prohibition were enforced it increased the chances a rape might occur,
which would create a serious problem for Colonel Ritter.
Scheffel headed downtown to where multiple established and well run bordellos were
operating. A number of houses had opened up for the enlisted men. Scheffel located a five story
hotel that was doubling as a bordello in which two dozen women71 serviced French officers.
However, with the French out of town the bordello was empty and ready for business.72 Scheffel
walked in with a musette bag with three thousand dollars in it and negotiated a price with the
madam. With a house secured, the logistical side needed to be attended to. Other units occupied
the town. One of the sister regiments, the 47th Infantry, was nearby, as were other soldiers from
the First Infantry Division. The regiment, as a result of the fighting at El Guettar, had only 1200
men in it. Not all had been lost to venereal disease; some had been lost to diarrhea and other
causes.
Transportation was the first pressing issue. How was Scheffel going to manage the
transportation of 1200 men thirty miles away through a strange land? His answer was to
requisition battalion supply trucks so that they could be used to transport the men from their
camp at Magenta into Sidi-bel-Abbès. By procuring the trucks, Scheffel demonstrated that the
order was unit-wide. Soldiers likely caught word of a bordello being established when Scheffel
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initially made his rounds asking for money. The round trip from Magenta to Sidi-bel-Abbès took
roughly two hours. Scheffel accounted for three round trips per day. While two dozen women
could service ten or twelve men a day, it still did not allow for 400 men at a time, which would
have been needed to cover everybody. Instead Scheffel set up a rationing system where one
hundred soldiers could go at a time.73 Scheffel instituted a ticketing system where he developed
little red tickets that were treated as ones pass into the bordello. Scheffel saved this item in one
of his scrapbooks. Since his family would go on to see this scrapbook, Scheffel noted that it is
for “passage to the sporting house in Sidi-bel-Abbès.”74
Arguably the most important aspect of the entire operation was the introduction of
penicillin into the already established system of genital inspections and prophylaxis staton. In the
lobby of the hotel, Scheffel established a prophylaxis station. One of the battalion doctors was on
hand to administer yet another “short arm” inspection. This short arm inspection would prove to
be more critical than one performed in the field since it gave a doctor one last look literally
minutes before the sexual encounter. Every man on top of these inspections would receive a “pro
kit” which contained a condom and some salve that was supposed to cure any possible type of
sexual ailment known at the time. If the kit failed, or if a man was seen to have a venereal
disease upon check in, he received a penicillin shot and was sent to the back of the line to heal
and rest.
Military Police were also an integral part of the operation. Many examples can be found
of disorder in the North African theater of operations, but at Lieutenant Scheffel’s bordello order
prevailed. Military police set up a barricade of concertina wire in the front of the house, which
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provided security around the house. Most importantly this added layer of security kept the men
in line, especially after they had consumed alcohol. Scheffel notes in his book that they were
there specifically to “keep our drunks and rowdies in line.”75 Military police also handled
soldiers who got out of line, overstayed their welcome, or engaged in some other behavior that
was not tolerated in the bordello.
Venereal disease cases in the 39th Infantry went down according to Scheffel’s account.76
Most important to solving the initial problem which created the need for this organized system
Scheffel says, “the penicillin did its job, or so the doctors told me. And the men believed in it.
This had nothing to do with combat directly, but indirectly it was most important. It got men
ready to fight.77 Scheffel had done his job. He had confronted a problem that was a serious one to
the fighting integrity of his unit. Free from the fear of mercury injections and hospital stays, the
men were energized realizing that penicillin would cure their issues. He utilized what resources
he had, while integrating new ways to fight venereal disease. By setting up a quota system that
was highly regulated, he was able to tackle this one specific problem and return his unit to a level
of acceptable combat readiness. Colonel William Ritter acknowledged his success.
Not all saw it this way, though. A few weeks after the successful establishment of the
system, Scheffel was called into Colonel Ritter’s office. Three civilians were waiting for him
inside. Ritter went on to say, “Lieutenant Scheffel, these three gentlemen are here from the
American Red Cross in London. They are here to investigate what you’re doing to corrupt the
morals of American servicemen in North Africa.” Mail was censored, but somehow mothers had
received word in the United States that whorehouses were being operated by the military. The
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three men were in their 60’s and 70’s and represented a cross section of American occupations.
One worked for a steel company, one worked for Heinz, and the other was a former
businessman, all finding employment with the Red Cross and its expanded war time roles.78
According to Scheffel’s account he was forced to defend himself on the spot. Scheffel
told his story to these three men who were there to sniff out immoral activities. After a full half
hour of informing these men of every last detail the men said upon Scheffel’s conclusion,
“That’s an incredible story, Lieutenant.” Scheffel responded,” Yes sir it is. But if you had been in
my shoes, or the colonel’s here, what would you have done?” According to Scheffel the
gentleman had a consensus in their response when they said, “Same as you did, Lieutenant.
Forget this visit.”79
Colonel Ritter, who gave the order to Lieutenant Scheffel to establish the bordello in the
first place, must have known that this was a fundamentally illegal order, but that did not stop him
from enabling Scheffel to procure the supplies he needed to get the job done. Receiving the
blessings of the Army Surgeon General certainly helped as well. Once it was recommended that
U.S forces regulate existing bordellos, Ritter, and anyone else who was complicit in the 39th
Infantry Regiment would be absolved of any wrong doing. After the Red Cross visit Scheffel
remembered, “The operation lasted another few days until the 9th Division went back to Bizerte,
Tunisia, the jumping off point for the invasion of Sicily.80
The successful operation of a bordello in Sidi-bel-Abbès would come to an end as the
regiment, and the division, embarked for the Invasion of Sicily in July of 1943. By managing and
maintaining order in a foreign land, Scheffel’s actions under direct order from Col. Ritter
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undoubtedly kept his unit in an improved fighting condition. Realizing that there was a problem,
but more importantly a solution, was key to the health of the 39th Infantry. By utilizing penicillin,
Scheffel was able to take the French system, and turn it into a system that produced excellent
results from an Allied and strategic perspective.

Conclusion
Major William Brumfield was tasked with examining prostitution in Africa, the Middle
East, and India during World War II. His account is famous for its analysis of the Japanese
comfort women and their fates during World War II. Brumfield was aware that many American
units directly controlled local prostitution as a method of controlling venereal disease.81 While
the idea of running a bordello seemed new to Charles Scheffel, it undoubtedly was not a new
practice for the American military. In fact, Brumfield noted that in areas occupied by British and
American soldiers, practices existed before the introduction of penicillin that helped maintain
acceptable venereal disease rates. Brumfield also noted that roughly 5 million condoms were
captured from the Italians in North Africa and helped contribute to the practice of safe sex.82
Brumfield also confirmed what Scheffel learned about safety and security. Brumfield observed
that all successful bordellos in North Africa had a prophylaxis station, a doctor present to
perform checks, military police, and a regulated system to keep the infected out. What was
revolutionary to the tactics Scheffel used was the introduction of penicillin. Penicillin alone
helped craft a more successful civil affairs plan.
The civil affairs plan in North Africa heavily relied on the premise that the French, once
subdued and convinced of American victory, would maintain control over the Arab populations,
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thus creating an environment where existing civil control and authority could maintain the status
quo of the indigenous way of life. Fortunately for the Allies they were able to maintain this status
quo to a large degree, but did not account for the human interaction and social activity. A pre
determining factor were the moral attitudes bred from World War I, and despite overwhelming
evidence that venereal disease was a known problem in North Africa; organizational clarity on
the issue did not exist, leaving men like Colonel William Ritter and Lieutenant Scheffel to
handle the situation themselves.
The Army limited civilian access to its supply chains. Civilian access to any supplies was
seen as a strain on the supplies of the men fighting to win the war. Merchant ships had limited
space for civilian supplies. The Army admitted in a supply memo that they are not going to be
able to maintain a pre German occupation level of food and supplies to the civilians. Later
messages request that civilian supplies be relegated to the control of disease, including venereal
disease.83 This makes the accomplishments of Lieutenant Scheffel and the success he
demonstrated even more remarkable.
Colonel Perrin Long’s recommendation to operate brothels out in the open, which was
meant to keep venereal disease under control allowed for William Ritter’s decision to set up and
establish a regimental bordello in Sidi-bel-Abbès. With the battalion surgeon in the room, Ritter
felt comfortable issuing the order to Scheffel to set up and operate the bordello. This is important
because it demonstrates Ritter was issuing these orders as a result of established medical opinion.
Support from all aspects of the 39th Infantry demonstrated organized complicity on a number of
levels that contributed to the successful operation of the bordello. Scheffel worked with nearly
every aspect of the regiment during his operation. Soldiers, supply, medical personnel, and
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military police all had a hand in assisting Scheffel. By receiving the blessing of the regimental
commander, Scheffel had all the clout required to set up the operation. From requisitioning
battalion supply trucks, to ensuring that a medical officer was present in the bordello, Scheffel
had complicity at every angle and every turn. Perhaps most impressive is his wrangling of the
military police, who, “rolled out concertina wire, guarded the place against intruders from other
units, and kept our drunks and rowdies in line.”84 The policemen also roused soldiers out of the
bedrooms if they had overstayed their welcome.
The Red Cross visit that was paid to the 39th Infantry highlights the level of home front
morality and concern, and how it did not correspond with desires on the ground. Through
Scheffel’s actions in setting up a bordello, he was following the recommendation made by Dr.
Perrin Long in that doctors should be present, as well as prophylactic stations in any bordello
where U.S soldiers frequented. Dr. Long was an MD, and as such understood the medical
realities of certain situations. While his order ran counter to the May Act and other established
policies, he issued the order since he understood the severity, and social realities of the situation.
The bordello that was run in Sidi-bel- Abbès was not illegal, but was set up and operated
according to the specifications per the recommendations of Dr. Perrin Long. Long had seen firsthand how the established bordellos ran. He also saw firsthand how the established medical
procedure was not followed (blue methlyne). With the introduction of penicillin into the
established medical checkpoints, Scheffel was able to mirror the system already in place, but do
it much better and more effectively.
William Ritter’s order to Scheffel freed every support unit that provided a service to the
39th Infantry. One can reasonably assume that the level of complicity was high amongst the
supply battalions, as well as the military police because they themselves might be interested in
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frequenting such an establishment. After the hard fighting at El Guettar, culminating with the
39th Infantry’s final attacks in Algeria, Ritter probably felt to an extent that the men deserved to
relax and get away from military life a bit. Ritter allowed this bordello to openly run and operate
because of the realization by medical officers that the venereal disease problem in North Africa
was massive.
Civil Affairs policies in North Africa would continue long after the men of the 9th
Infantry Division left North Africa, and the responsibilities of civilian governance became an
expanding proposition as the Army began its trek into Sicily. On a budgetary level the American
Army was gravely concerned about the cost and upkeep of governance of civilian areas.85 On a
public relations level, the military wanted to keep some of the ugly aspects of war away from the
eyes of the public. Prostitution, as an “illegal” operation, was permitted by the United States
military in North Africa during World War II, with the support and endorsement of US Army
Medical personnel in the name of maintaining civil order and combat effectiveness in the US
Army in North Africa in 1943.
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